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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to 
review issues not presented for decision to the Court of 
Appeals? 
2. Should this Court consider reviewing the denial of 
a zoning variance when the petitioner has never even 
attempted to meet the statutory grounds for the granting of 
a variance? 
3. Should this Court grant a Writ of Certiorari to 
review factual issues concerning the denial of a zoning 
variance? 
4. Should sanctions pursuant to Rule 40(a) and Rule 
33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, be granted for the 
petitioner's frivolous, harassing and delaying petition? 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The Court of Appeals determined to review the District 
Court's grant of Summary Judgment in favor of the City Board 
o f A d j u s t m e n t u n d e r I t s R u l e 31 R I I tah Ct App p r o c e d u r e 
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following powei . 
(3) to authorize upon appeal such variance 
from the terms of the ordinance as will not 
be contrary to the public interest, where 
owing to special conditions a literal 
enforcement of the provisions of the 
ordinance will result in unnecessary 
ha. irdship; provided, that the spirit of the 
ordinance shall be observed and substantial 
justice done. Before any variance may be 
authorized, however, it shall be shown that: 
It is barely possible to ascertain from the maundering 
cirgument of the Petition shadowy out! I nes of reliance on 
Rule 43(1), (3) and (4). 
(a) The variance will not substantially 
affect the comprehensive plan of zoning in 
the city and that adherence to the strict 
letter of the ordinance will cause 
difficulties and hardships, the imposition of 
which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in 
order to carry out the general purpose of the 
plan. 
(b) Special circumstances attached to the 
property covered by the application which do 
not generally apply to the other property in 
the same district. 
(c) That because of said special 
circumstances, property covered by 
application is deprived of privileges 
possessed by other properties in the same 
district; and that the granting of the 
variance is essential to the enjoyment of a 
substantial property right possessed by other 
property in the same district. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action arose from the Salt Lake City Board of 
Adjustment ("the Board") denying the petitioners ("the 
Tolds") a variance for an illegal carport. The petitioners 
have never even attempted to meet any of the standards for 
the grant of a variance as required by Section 10-9-12(3), 
U.C.A. 
B. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
After the Toldsf variance request was denied by the 
Board the Tolds appealed the decision to the Third Judicial 
District Court pursuant to Section 10-9-15, U.C.A.. The 
parties mad^ ?r??^ rr^-i^r ~ T Summary Judgment. In support 
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citation to the record. 
their illegal carport from the Board which was denied by the 
Board on March 1, 1987. (R. 79, Findings No. 9.) 
4. The Tolds again petitioned the Board relying on 
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976) and 
presented a list of allegedly similar violations near their 
property. (R. 79, Findings No. 10.) 
5. Never, throughout the entire course of the 
proceeding below (including the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals), have the Tolds submitted evidence of any 
"special circumstance" attached to their property not 
generally applicable to other properties in their same 
zoning district as required by Section 10-9-12(3)(b). Nor 
have they ever submitted any evidence why the nonexistent 
special circumstances "deprived" them of any privileges 
possessed by other properties in the same district denying 
them the "enjoyment of a substantial property right," as 
required by Section 10-9-12(3)(c). Further the record is 
devoid of any evidence of any attempt to show any 
"difficulties and hardships" (except the Tolds obvious 
disregard of the law) as required for a variance by Section 
10-9-12(3)(a). (See entire record and the City's Brief to 
the Court of Appeals, p. 11.) 
6. Because of an absolute and total failure to meet 
any of the standards for a variance required by Section 10-
9-12(3) the Board again denied the requested variance 
holding, in part, that the Board, "could find no unusual 
condition attached to [the Tolds] property which would 
deprive the owner of a substantial property right or use of 
his property which would justify the granting of the 
requested variance." (R. 79, Finding No, 10.) 
7. Upon being presented with the Toldfs list of 
alleged nearby violations the City promptly and thoroughly 
investigated the alleged violations. The City took 
immediate action against those properties which were 
determined to be, in fact, in violation of the ordinance. 
(R. 79-80, Findings No. 11-19. ) 3 
8. The City's zoning enforcement personnel usually 
become aware of zoning violations in three ways: 
(a) When plans are submitted; 
(b) When neighbors complain; and 
(c) Occasionally, by a zoning inspector viewing a 
construction activity not in compliance with zoning. 
Throughout the Petition for Writ there are numerous 
insinuations that the City is in some way lying about its 
enforcement efforts. For example on page 5 the Petition 
twice intimates that only "allegedly" were some of the other 
violations ordered to comply. On page 6 a similar 
insinuation uses the word "supposedly." This Court is not 
the grounds for factual dispute which have long since been 
settled against the Tolds' arguments. The City's counsel 
takes personal umbrage at the insulting phraseology of the 
Petition. The City has done precisely what it claimed in 
its Affidavits to have done without any weasely 
qualifications. This factual quibbling and insulting is yet 
another reasons that sanctions should be granted against the 
Tolds as more fully specified in Point II, below. 
This Cityfs financial resources are not sufficient to 
hire enough building inspectors to catch every violation 
before construction is completed. Thus, the City relies 
heavily on being informed of violations by citizens. This 
is especially true where, as here, the illegal construction 
was done without a permit. (R. 78, Findings No. 3 and 4.) 
POINT I 
THERE ARE NO SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT 
REASONS FOR GRANTING A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Petition should be denied for several reasons. 
First, fifty percent of the Petition is an attempt to raise 
issues which were never raised at the Court of Appeals. 
Second, even though the Tolds and their counsel have now 
taken four bites at the apple of a variance they have 
totally failed to even attempt compliance with the statutory 
grounds for issuing a variance. Third, there is no special 
and important reason, and certainly none of those listed in 
Rule 43, R.U.S.C., for the Writ to issue. Fourth, none of 
the various "throw everything against the kitch€»n wall and 
hope some of it sticks" allegations of error below are 
correct. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW ISSUES 
NOT RAISED BELOW. 
The Board can find no reported cases arising under Rule 
42, R.U.S.C., concerning this Court's scope of review of 
decisions from the Court of Appeals on certiorari. The 
general principle of law is that a higher appellate court 
will not review matters not raised in the intermediate court 
of appeals. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); 
Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231 (1976); Walters v. City of 
St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); Murrow v. Daniels, 364 
S.E.2d 392 (N.C. 1988); Personnel Board v. Heck, 725 S.W.2d 
13 (Ky.App. 1986); L & H Transport, Inc. v. Drew Agency, 
Inc., 403 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1987); Morgan v. Compugraphic 
Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984); Settlemyer v. Wilmington 
Veterans Post No. 49, American Legion, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 521 
(Ohio 1984); Parrell v. Keenan, 452 N.E.2d 506 (Mass. 1983); 
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E.2d 210 
(111. 1983); Bender v. City of Seattle, 664 P.2d 492 (Wash. 
1983); Centers v. Yehezkely, 706 P.2d 105 (Idaho App. 1985). 
The logic behind this rule is the same as this Court's 
refusal to consider issues on appeal not raised by the trial 
court. That is, this Court is entitled to the benefit of 
informed opinions below to frame the issues for decision. 
Absent such preservation of issues below, this Court will 
generally not consider an issue for the first time. Buehner 
Block Company v. U.W.C. Associates, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1988); Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. North American 
Title Insurance Company, 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988); Mascaro 
v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
More than half of the Petition for Writ consists of 
matters not raised at the Court of Appeals. The Petition's 
"third and final reason" alleged for this Court to issue the 
Writ of Certiorari (Petition p. 12-14) paints a bizarre 
Orwellian nightmare world where citizens are forced, against 
their will and in their complete innocence, to rat on their 
neighbors for their own protection. The illogic of this 
argument is pointed out in Section I.E.(4) of this Brief 
below. For now, the Board simply points out that this 
screed was never raised in the Court of Appeals. 
Further, the Petition's argument (Petition p. 6-8) that 
the District Court's consideration of the Board's Affidavit 
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment somehow 
violated Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 
685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) was also never raised below. 
Finally, the Petition's contention that somehow the City was 
"intentionally" discriminating in its enforcement against 
the petitioner (Petition p. 8-9) has never been properly 
raised. There has never been a shred of evidence of any 
"intent" to discriminate against the Tolds. The Tolds are 
simply repeated offenders who were caught and now try to 
excuse their hands being in the cookie jar by pointing to 
others with chocolate chip fingerprints. (The absurdity of 
the intentional discrimination argument will be further 
shown in Section I.E.(3) of this Brief below.) 
C. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
OVERTURNING THE TWO LOWER COURTS 
AND GRANTING A VARIANCE WHEN THERE 
HAS BEEN NO ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH 
THE STATUTORY STANDARDS. 
The standards for granting a variance are set out in 
Section 10-9-12(3), (a)-(c), U.C.A. This Court expounded on 
the standards in Xanthos, supra at 1036-37: 
What must be shown by the applicant for the 
variance is that the property itself 
contained some special circumstances that 
relate to the hardship complained of and that 
granting a variance to take this into account 
would not substantially affect the zoning 
plan. 
* * * 
Hardship is not demonstrated by economic loss 
alone. It must be tied to the special 
circumstances, none of which have been proven 
here. Every person requesting a variance can 
indicate some economic loss. To allow 
variance any time any economic loss is 
alleged would make a mockery of the zoning 
program. Further, the [plaintiffs] brought 
their losses upon themselves. The applica-
tion [for building permit] affirmatively 
alleged to the City that no dwelling existed 
on the land upon which he proposed to build 
duplexes, and the City relied on those 
allegations. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Before the Board, before the District Court, before the 
Court of Appeals and in this Petition, the Tolds have not 
even attempted to meet the requirements of the statute. The 
Tolds have never shown any "special circumstances attached 
to [their property]." They have never shown how these 
nonexistent "special circumstances" are "essential to the 
enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by 
others in the district." 
All the Tolds have said before the Board, the District 
Court, the Court of Appeals and in this Petition is that 
because some of their neighbors have constructed similar 
illegal structures the Tolds must then, ipso facto, be 
allowed to construct their own illegal structure. The 
argument of the Tolds, in their Petition, can be summarized 
as "fourteen wrongs make a right." They do not. There is 
no provision in the statutory grant of authority to the 
Board for the issuance of variances to consider that other 
4 
similar illegalities may exist. At each level of this 
proceeding the Board had pointed out to the Tolds their 
failure to meet the statutory requirements. Despite three 
bites at the apple they continue before this Court to not 
even bother attempting to comply with the statute. As their 
repeated illegal buildings are subject to zoning sanctions 
so their repeated failure to brief the controlling issue of 
this case should also be the subject of sanctions as 
discussed more fully in Point II below. 
It might be argued that the existence of other similar 
violations goes to meet part 3(a) of the test for granting a 
variance (that the variance will not "substantially affect 
the comprehensive plan"). But this Court held in Xanthos 
that the tests of Section 10-9-12(3) are cumulative and 
written in the conjunctive. All the tests must be met 
before the variance can legally be issued. 
D. THERE ARE NOT "SERIOUS AND 
IMPORTANT" REASONS FOR THIS COURT 
TO REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
DECISION. 
The Court of Appeals found the Toldsf contentions to be 
so unmeritorious as to warrant Rule 31, no-opinion, 
consideration. The trial court considered the matter on 
cross Motions for Summary Judgment and issued detailed 
Findings and Conclusions thoroughly supported by 
unchallenged evidence. In essence, the case boils down to a 
repeated lawbreaker seeking an indulgence simply because 
others have broken the same law. There is no way, despite 
the plaintive Jeremiad of the Petition, for this Court to 
find "serious and important" reasons to give comfort and 
solace to an unrepentant recidivist. 
E. NONE OF THE ALLEGED ERRORS BELOW 
ARE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW. 
(1) THE PETITION'S ATTEMPT TO RAISE 
FACTUAL ISSUES IS INAPPROPRIATE. 
The Petition brings up at least two factual issues 
never considered below and totally unsupported by the 
record. First, the Petition pulls from the air an 
allegation of intentional discrimination. (Petition, p. 8.) 
As noted above and below there is absolutely no evidence of 
any intentional discrimination against the Tolds. 
The petitioners also now ask this Court to reverse the 
trial court's Summary Judgment (on cross-motions) to make a 
factual determination as to whether or not an evidentiary 
hearing should have been held on issues of arbitrariness and 
capriciousness. (Petition p. 11.) Again, this issue was 
never raised in the Court of Appeals and there is nothing in 
the record before this Court, the Court of Appeals or the 
District Court indicating any dispute about the evidence. 
This is not a Sixth Amendment denial of effective counsel 
argument. At some point the finality of review should drive 
a stake through the heart of the petitioner's vampirous 
failure to give up their meritless arguments. 
(2) EVIDENCE OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
NOT IMPROPER. 
The Toldsf only objection to the Board's evidence 
before the District Court of enforcement on other violations 
can be found in one sentence on page 5 of the petitioners? 
Memorandum to the District Court in opposition to 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
The defendant's enforcement of the 
ordinance against the fourteen other 
residents is not relevant to this case 
and should not be considered when 
deciding this matter. 
(R. 56.) 
That is the sum total of their objection to the 
evidence. The objection is both legally and factually 
wrong. It is legally wrong because it is clear from 
Kartchner that this Court considered the lack of enforcement 
evidence to be relevant and controlling on the issue of 
estoppel: 
Witnesses for the County conceded at least 
six similar violations of the setback 
ordinance within the vicinity of defendantf s 
property, and there was no evidence to 
indicate any attempt to enforce the zoning 
law in these other instances. 
Kartchner, supra at 140. (Emphasis added.) 
The Toldsf argument is also factually wrong because 
enforcement actions are factually relevant. It is not 
possible for the City to hire enough building inspectors to 
catch every violator before their building is completed. 
This is especially true where the illegal construction is 
done without a permit such as in this case. (R. 78, 
Findings No. 4.) The City's zoning enforcement personnel 
usually become aware of zoning violations either when the 
plans are submitted, when neighbors complain or, 
occasionally, when a zoning inspector fortuitously catching 
construction activity in progress. (R. 78, Findings No. 3.) 
In this case it would have been impossible to catch the 
Toldsf violations by plans because they failed to obtain a 
permit. In any event, the Tolds had a past history of 
filing improper and distorted plans concealing the true 
facts. (R. 78, Findings Nos. 5-8.) As for the neighboring 
violations they were caught due to the Tolds' complaint. 
The Tolds somehow argue that since they pointed out the 
neighboring violations to the Board not only are the Tolds 
immune from enforcement but so are the neighbors. (See 
Tolds1 Brief pp. 17-18.) The argument that one violator can 
insulate himself, and other violators, from any enforcement 
by merely pointing out the other violations is so lacking in 
logic and inherently absurd that it does not deserve a 
reply. Such a rule of law would eviscerate the City's 
zoning enforcement. 
(3) THERE WAS NO IMPROPER 
DISCRIMINATION 
The Petition's argument analogizing the City's actions 
to an excuse for racial discrimination is absurd and 
insulting. First, there is no evidence of any intent on 
behalf of the City to discriminate at all. Second, the City 
is unaware of any cases holding scoflaws to be a protected 
class. Third, discrimination in enforcement of zoning 
ordinances, by the mere fact that it is impossible to catch 
every violator, is expected, accepted and approved. In Cook 
v. City of Price, 566 F.2d 699, 701 (10th Cir. 1977) the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
considered an argument similar to that raised by this 
Petition: 
Rather, appellant merely claims 
discrimination in that the ordinance was not 
enforced against other known violators. . . . 
For ninety years it has been established that 
a law fair on its face may be applied so 
arbitrarily and unfairly as to amount to a 
violation of constitutional rights. . . . 
However, when the discrimination is not aimed 
at a "suspect class" a plaintiff must show 
intentional or purposeful discrimination. 
Mere failure to prosecute other offenders is 
no basis for a finding of denial of equal 
protection. !f[T]he conscious exercise of 
some selectivity in enforcement is not in 
itself a federal constitutional violation." 
• • • Selective enforcement without 
malicious intent may be justified when a test 
case is needed to clarify doubtful law, . . . 
or when officials seek to prosecute a 
particularly egregious violation and thereby 
deter other violators. . . . 
5 6 (Citations omitted, emphasis added.) 
(4) THERE ARE NO ORWELLIAN CONSEQUENCES 
TO THE CITY'S ACTIONS. 
The ToldsT hysterical charge that the City's practice 
is a fatal threat to American Democracy (Petition p. 13) is 
ludicrous. There is no requirement that neighbors rat on 
each other about zoning violations. However, if a zoning 
violator chooses to rely on an estoppel defense based on 
neighboring violations what would the Tolds have the City 
do? Would the petitioner merely have to come in and say: 
"There are other violations in my neighborhood but I'm not 
going to tell you where they are." This Court cannot 
sanction such an Easter egg hunt system of zoning. To the 
Before the Court of Appeals the petitioners deliberately 
attempted to mislead that Court by citing only the one 
sentence in the above quotation of basic law barely 
favorable to their position. The petitioners totally failed 
to cite or point out to the Court the fact that the entire 
quote destroys their argument. 
The Tenth Circuit also took note that the appellee in Cook 
informed the Court that the deterent effect of enforcement 
worked, as other violators ceased their illegal practices. 
Cook, supra at 701. In the instant case the successful 
deterrent and corrective effects are already a matter of 
record. (R. 79-80, Findings No. 11-19.) 
extent a repeat offender chooses to point fingers at other 
violators the City should at least be entitled to know where 
the finger is pointing. 
POINT II. 
THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED SANCTIONS 
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND PETITIONERS' 
COUNSEL FOR THIS FRIVOLOUS, HARASSING 
AND DELAYING APPEAL. 
As noted in Point I above, the Petition fails in 
numerous respects to comply with the Rules of this Court. 
There is no proper statement for the basis of jurisdiction; 
there is no quotation of controlling statutes; there is no 
citation to the record; and, there is no statement of any 
"special and important reason" for the grant of the Writ. 
Further, in violation of all basic precepts of 
appellate review, the Petition asks this Court to review 
numerous arguments not presented to the trial Court or the 
Court of Appeals. (The most egregious example is the Tolds 
asking this Court to send the matter back for a factual 
determination at the District Court when the issue was 
decided below on cross Motions for Summary Judgments and 
this supposed factual dispute was never raised to the Court 
of Appeals.) Thirdly, for the fourth time the Tolds have 
failed absolutely to even attempt compliance with the 
statutory grounds for the grant of a variance. Despite the 
City's repeated pointing out of this omission the Petition 
glaringly fails to make any attempt at compliance. Further, 
none of the alleged errors of the Court of Appeals are 
argued with any logic or proper citations to cases or the 
record. A mere whining hysterical lamentation is not 
sufficient grounds for the issuance of a Writ. 
Finally, the petitioners' cynical attempt to take 
advantage of this Court's backlog and delay, to extend the 
time for compliance with the City's zoning ordinances, makes 
a mockery of justice. As noted in this Brief, and in the 
District Court's Order, a number of the other violators 
pointed out by the Tolds have complied with the City's 
ordinances. Other who refused have been prosecuted. Only 
the Tolds have obstinately maintained their violation of the 
law. To allow the Tolds continuing bad faith tactics to 
prevail without sanctions would be an insult to those who 
have complied. 
This Petition violates Rule 33(a) in that it is clearly 
frivolous and for the purpose of delay. It also violates 
Rule 40(a) in that there could be no good faith grounds 
formed after reasonable inquiry for this Court to grant the 
Writ. 
As in Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987), the 
Tolds' mischaracterization of the record, failure to follow 
the rules, abuse of appellate process and other 
transgressions warrants the imposition of sanctions. See 
also, O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 
1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 750 
P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
There are no special and important reasons to grant the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The Petition should be 
dismissed and the City should be awarded sanctions against 
the Tolds and the Toldsf counsel for violations of rules 
33(a) and 40(a), R.U.S.C. 
list DATED this J I" day of May, 1989. 
BRUCE' TJ. BAIRD 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Brief to J. Bruce Reading, MORGAN, SCALLEY & 
READING, 261 East 300 South, No. 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, this day of May, 1989. 
BRB:cc 
